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Abstract
This article reads the restructuring of European party systems in the 2010s as a transition from cartel to techno-populist
parties, with a specific focus on left-populist challengers. Adopting a historical-institutionalist perspective, it demonstrates
how a long-term cartelization and particular mode of crisis management after 2008 drove the gradual replacement of
the party cartel with a cohabitation of populism and technocratic politics: techno-populism. Although this techno-populist
template has been deployed for parties such as Five Star Movement and some right-wing populist outfits, it has usually
been left aside for left-wing variants. This article investigates two techno-populist subtypes from the left: Corbynism in the
United Kingdom and Podemos in Spain. The former took place within a cartel party (‘intra-party’), while the latter occurred
from outside the party cartel (‘extra-party’). Although such party cartelization cuts across cases, the rise of Corbynism and
Podemos took place under different institutional conditions: different electoral systems, different European Union mem-
bership and different dynamics of party competition on the left. The article concludes with the observation that rather
than an anomaly, the presence of techno-populist tropes in and outside of parties and across institutional settings indi-
cates the pervasiveness of these logics in contemporary European party politics.
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1. Introduction
The aftermath of the 2008 crisis saw the reintro-
duction of a curious term into the English lexicon:
‘techno-populism.’ Launched by political scientists Chris
Bickerton and Carlo Invernizzi in 2018, the term was
previously deployed in the early 1990s by the political
scientist Carlos de la Torre to characterise a series of
Latin American politicians (de la Torre, 2013). In 2020,
however, the term was meant to denote the increas-
ing cohabitation of technocratic and populist elements
in the same political camps, from the Italian Five Star
Movement to the Dutch Forum for Democracy (FVD)
to Macron’s En Marche (Bickerton & Invernizzi, 2017,
2018). The term’s relaunch in the late 2010s also came
as no surprise.
At the close of the 2010s, upheavals from both
left, right and centre reconfigured party systems across
Europe andmarginalised existing traditional parties. Two
terms—‘populism’ and ‘technocracy’—have proven par-
ticularly apt at capturing these shifts. Both indicate the
decline of classical party politics and the rise of new
models of political organization across the ideological
spectrum. Both are also typically conceived as oppo-
sites. While populism celebrates the wisdom of the
‘people,’ technocrats plead for expertise and seek to
insulate policy-making from partisan interference. This
dichotomy has steadily settled into mainstream politi-
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cal science, with populist and technocratic styles of gov-
ernance now regularly contrasted in comparative work
(Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017; Urbinati, 2020; Weyland,
2017). Other studies, however, have hinted at the sur-
prising degree of convergence between both political
currents. Rather than a stark opposition, technocracy
and populism seem to share an essential ‘complemen-
tarity’ in their rejection of party mediation (Bickerton
& Invernizzi, in press; Caramani, 2017). Both exhibit
a refusal to filter collective wills through intermedi-
ary bodies and an antagonism towards social pluralism.
As Bickerton and Invernizzi note, “populist and techno-
cratic forms of discourse can be considered as two sides
of the same coin” (Bickerton & Invernizzi, 2017, p. 16).
Techno-populist manifestations are often considered
to be confined to new, less partisan formations or sepa-
rate from the respective left-wing parties. However, addi-
tional ground can be explored regarding the co-existence
of these two logics upon different party families and their
wider effects on party systems. In this regard, recent
work on populism has introduced a helpful distinction
between ‘extra-party’ and ‘intra-party’ populism (Bale
& Watts, 2018). The former occurs when novel populist
parties compete with established parties, while the lat-
ter denotes the strengthening of populist forces within
established parties and the reordering of these parties
from the inside. Working with and through this distinc-
tion, this article applies the ‘internal–external’ motif to
two populist cases on the left: Corbynism in the United
Kingdom (UK) and Podemos in Spain. Both can be typi-
fied as ‘left-populist’ movements that arose in response
to a similar set of processes: a short-term austerity con-
sensus taken up by established social democratic par-
ties during the 2008 crisis and a deeper process of
party system cartelization. The Corbynitemovement and
Podemos also adopted, both by choice and necessity, a
political model anchored on expertise and technical com-
petence, thus representing a particular ‘techno-populist’
subtype of left-populism.
Corbynism and Podemos took place in different insti-
tutional contexts, which inflicted the distinct mode in
which ‘left techno-populism’ arose in both countries:
inside and outside the existing parties. Table 1 sum-
marises the commonalities and institutional differences
that created the conditions for the rise of Podemos and
Corbynism in Spain and the UK. Such institutional differ-
ences spanned: (i) electoral systems—first-past-the-post
vs. proportional representation; (ii) type of European
Union membership—euro-out vs. euro-in; and (iii) com-
petitive dynamics within the left—monopolistic in the
UK vs. more fragmented in Spain. In the UK, in turn, the
opening of the Labour Party’s list to external voters with
semi-open primaries proved a crucial catalyst for the rise
of Corbynism.
Scholars have put forward a flurry of explanations for
the rise of populist contenders (Bickerton & Invernizzi,
2017; Eichengreen, 2018; Goodwin & Eatwell, 2018;
Hopkin & Blyth, 2019; Manow, 2016; Norris & Inglehart,
2019; Rodrik, 2018). Although not necessarily compati-
ble with each other, these explanations have contributed
to a better understanding of the complex interplay
of social, political and economic changes behind the
re-emergence of populism in established democracies.
While we do not engage with all of these explanations,
we argue that the cartelization of parties and party sys-
tems operates as a relevant meso-level factor, especially
for sociological and institutional accounts. In deploying
a historical-institutionalist approach, the article offers a
historical overview of recent left-populist experiments
whilst mapping the changing institutional environment
in which party politics takes place.
The first section of the present article investigates
the concept of ‘cartelization’ as theorised by an earlier
generation of party politics scholars. The article specifi-
cally offers a theory of how different institutional condi-
tions facilitate both intra- and extra-party changes after
the passing of the cartel party. It then provides a short
primer on ‘techno-populism’ as a compound of two sep-
arate but complementary political logics. The article then
argues for an extension of this hybrid techno-populist
logic to specific left-populist cases. The second half of the
paper tests the concepts of ‘cartelization’ and ‘techno-
populism’ for the cases of Corbynism and Podemos, aris-
ing in both intra- and extra-party contexts. The results
are instructive: The presence of techno-populist tropes
in and outside of parties, including a newly oppositional
left, indicates the pervasiveness rather than marginality
of these logics, and signals a deeper change in Europe’s
party democracy (Bickerton & Invernizzi, in press).
2. Cartelization, ‘Intra-Party’ and ‘Extra-Party’ Change
‘Cartelization’ has flourished as a subfield of political sci-
ence during the last three decades. Chiefly driven by
Table 1. ‘Intra-party’ and ‘extra-party’ techno-populism: Commonality and institutional differences.
UK Spain
Commonality Party cartelizationFiscal response to the 2008 crisis
Institutional Differences ‘Intra-party’ ‘Extra-party’
Electoral System Majoritarian ‘first-past-the-post’ Proportional representation
EU Membership Euro-out Euro-in
Left Competition Dynamics Hegemonic Fragmented
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political scientists Peter Mair and Richard Katz, the ‘car-
tel party thesis’ aimed to make sense of wide-ranging
developments taking place within political parties and
the party systems of advanced capitalist states (Blyth &
Katz, 2005; Hopkin & Blyth, 2019; Katz & Mair, 1995,
2009, 2018; Kitschelt, 2000; Koole, 1996). The cartel
thesis was able to spotlight many changes of its con-
temporary political landscape, emphasising the increas-
ing retreat of parties into the state, declining party
membership, the increasing programmatic convergence
between parties and the growing influence of tech-
nocrats on policy-making.
Cartel theorists thus drew attention to changes
occurring between andwithin political parties.More pre-
cisely, at the systemic level, the thesis tracked a pattern
of inter-party competition characterised by collusion
between relevant parties; a collusion that was largely
driven by shifts in the institutional environment where
these political parties operate.Meanwhile, at the level of
party organisation, the thesis posited the emergence of
a new type of party distinct from the catch-all party. This
cartel form of party was likely to emerge in democracies
characterised by “the interpenetration of party and state
and by a tendency towards inter-party collusion” (Katz
& Mair, 2009, p. 755). Though analytically distinct, both
notions—the party cartel at the systemic level and the
cartel party at the organisational level—remained closely
intertwined (Katz & Mair, 2009, p. 757).
The transition from ‘catch-all’ politics to carteliza-
tion was not linear but occurred in many Western
European party systems. Cartelizationwas already visible
in Switzerland, Austria and the Netherlands as early as
the 1960s, emerging in Italy in the late 1970s and early
1980s, and by the late 1990s had become the norm in
most established democracies (Bickerton & Invernizzi, in
press; Katz & Mair, 2018, pp. 133–134). Importantly, the
re-emergence of ‘anti-party’ parties in the wake of the
2008 global financial crisis has been posited as a direct
reaction to cartelization; as an antithesis to post-catch-all,
cartel politics (Hopkin & Blyth, 2019; Katz & Mair, 2018,
p. 151; Roberts, 2017, p. 292). This dialectical logic of
party development has been modelled as an “endless
series of thesis-antithesis-synthesis” whereby each new
party form stimulates an adaptation by its opposition
(Katz & Mair, 2018, p. 151). Thus, our central argument
concerning the role of cartelization upon the rise of left-
wing populism has a clear affinity with those put forward
by Katz and Mair (2018) and Hopkin and Blyth (2019).
Post-cartel politics have taken shape under various
institutional conditions. In this article, we highlight three:
diverse electoral systems, different types of EU mem-
bership, and contrasting competitive dynamics between
parties on the left. First, electoral systems establish
certain structural conditions for the success of politi-
cal entrepreneurship. For instance, electoral barriers for
new parties tend to be higher in majoritarian systems
than in proportional representation (PR) systems. A rel-
evant factor is the so-called ‘break-even point,’ i.e., the
percentage of votes beyond which a party obtains a rela-
tive advantage in terms of seats per votes (Taagepera &
Shugart, 1989). Typically, this threshold is higher in the
British first-past-the-post than in PR systems such as the
Spanish, making it more difficult for third parties in the
UK to translate votes into seats.
We can therefore speculate that, in an environment
of high electoral barriers, the chances of success of
a populist alternative increase if it takes place within
an electorally dominant party rather than as an ‘extra-
party’ alternative. Under more benign electoral condi-
tions, however, the cost of presenting an extra-party
alternative to the party cartel decreases. A case in point
is the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) which
in the 2015 general election won 12.6% of the vote and
only secured one MP. By contrast, in the 2015 Spanish
general election, Podemos won 12.6% of the vote and
secured 42 MPs. Whilst these parties received identical
vote share, they differ significantly in terms of seats and
political influence. In our comparison of Corbynism and
Podemos, this factor is relevant because it will shed light
on the different extra- and intra-party manifestations of
political entrepreneurship from the left.
The second relevant institutional condition we raise
concerns whether a country is a member of a common
currency area. Membership of these areas determines
how governing parties can respond to an economic cri-
sis, especially how monetary and fiscal responses can
be coordinated. In the European Union, governments in
the euro area (‘euro-in’) face greater policy constraints
to coordinate these responses than non-euro area gov-
ernments (‘euro-out’). During the 2010–2012 sovereign
debt crisis, for instance, a number of ‘euro-in’ govern-
ments had to implement a fiscal adjustment mainly
focused on expenditure cuts as a condition for EU exter-
nal and monetary support. To the extent that the party
cartels accepted the fiscal orthodoxy attached to this sup-
port, contesting this orthodoxy from inside these parties
was more difficult than challenging it from the outside.
The cases of the Italian Five Star Movement, the Greek
Syriza and the Spanish Podemos illustrate such a predica-
ment well (Bickerton & Invernizzi, 2018).
Conversely, challenging the policy orthodoxy from
within the party cartel is likely to be less costly when
a party’s defence of austerity is not associated with its
political stance on EU membership, nor with the coun-
try’s structural position as a member of the euro. Within
the Labour Party, for instance, anti-austerity views could
be dissociated from the party’s views on EUmembership
(cf. Bremer & McDaniel, 2020), unlike in Spain, Greece,
Italy or Portugal, where a radical critique of austerity
from within the party cartel would almost necessarily
entail questioning support for euro membership. More
generally, therefore, we can posit that euro member-
ship makes it less likely that an anti-austerity populist
insurgency would emerge from within the cartel party.
Instead, such populist insurgency is more likely to be
‘extra-party.’
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The third and final relevant institutional condition
we will raise regards contrasting competitive dynamics
between parties. The patterns of party competition in a
given ideological camp is likely to influence how party
changes may occur within this camp. Specifically, radi-
cal left politics may find different institutional avenues
depending on whether the competition between left-
wing parties ismonopolised by a hegemonic party or frag-
mented between moderate and radical left parties and
factions.
The Spanish case provides a helpful example. For
decades, the centre-left Socialist Party (PSOE) has been
the leading party of the Spanish left, but various politi-
cal forces have always coexisted to the left of the PSOE.
In 1986, following a series of bad electoral results and
organisational crisis, the Spanish Communist Party (PCE)
formed Izquierda Unida (IU, United Left), an electoral
coalition made up of seven smaller parties. By 2014,
when Podemos was founded, IU remained electorally
unsuccessful and relatively traditional in ideological
terms (Ramiro & Gomez, 2017, p. 111). The successive
electoral failures of the radical left, together with the
internal factionalism and ideological purism of the IU
(cf. Ramiro & Verge, 2013) are two relevant factors to
understand why the founders of Podemos decided to
create a new populist (‘extra-party’) alternative, instead
of seeking the internal route through the pre-existing
Communist left.
Contrastingly, party competition on the left has fol-
lowed a different pattern in the UK. With only minor
exceptions (e.g., the creation of the Social Democratic
Party in 1981), the British left has been the exclusive
dominion of the Labour Party, strengthened by its ties to
established unions and the persistence of the first-past-
the-post system. This hegemonic position reduced the
space of manoeuvre for left-populist challengers in the
2010s. However, following the adoption of a partial pri-
mary system in 2014 under the leadership of EdMiliband,
an intra-party space was opened up for a left-populist
takeover in the Labour Party.
From these comparative historical experiences, we
posit that a radical alternative to the party cartel is more
likely to adopt an extra-party character under conditions
of fragmented party competition. Although not sufficient
in itself, this factor is necessary to explain the differ-
ent intra-party and extra-party characters of Corbynism
and Podemos. While there are additional contextual and
individual-level factors that would provide an even more
detailed explanation, we argue that the three conditions
outlined here (the dynamics of party competition, type
of EUmembership and electoral barriers) offer aminimal
institutionalist account for the ‘internal–external’ modes
of populism in our two cases.
3. Varieties of Populism
Any study of populism must be situated—as Kenneth
M. Roberts suggests—in the larger domain of political
representation. In this sense, populism is necessarily
intertwined with the study of party politics (Roberts,
2017, p. 287). Mainstream definitions of populism have
focused on its ideological and discursive tendencies.
Following an interpretation of populism as a ‘thin ideol-
ogy’ (Mudde, 2004), most recent scholars see populism
as an ideology which divides the population into two
opposing and homogeneous camps: ‘people’ and ‘elite.’
As a political discourse, populism is predicated on a fun-
damentally moral conflict between the corrupt elite and
thepeople (Mudde&Kaltwasser, 2017). Thus, the ‘moral-
isation’ of politics stands out as the defining feature
of populist discourse, along with the idea that political
sovereignty belongs and should be exercised only by the
‘people’ (Pappas, 2016).
Although not necessarily compatible with other defi-
nitions,Mudde’s hegemonic interpretation overlapswith
discursive and strategic currents, which see populism
as a ‘people-centric’ strategy or a discourse seeking
to gain power from an existing power bloc (Laclau,
2005; Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2013; Weyland, 2017).
Ideational definitions have been faulted, nonetheless,
for their overtly normative overtones (Moffitt, 2020).
These and other conceptual concerns have led some
scholars to prefer the term ‘anti-establishment’ or
‘anti-system’ parties (Fernández-Albertos, 2018; Hopkin,
2020; Sartori, 2005; cf. Zulianello, 2019). Yet such for-
mulations lack references to the kind of representation
inherent to populism, which includes references to the
‘people’ above all and relies on a different type of politi-
cal mediation than that exercised by classical parties.
A more descriptive approach has recently become
available in the party politics literature. This approach
investigates the ongoing transformations of European
party systems and distances itself from normative judge-
ments on the dangers of populism and its purportedly
‘democratic’ or ‘anti-democratic’ nature. Instead, this
approach focuses on how the mechanisms of represen-
tation associated with populism interact with chang-
ing party systems. This method ties together parties
from the Five Star Movement to Podemos to the British
Conservative Party as partaking in the same shift from
party-based representation to a different kind of rep-
resentative regime, thereby contrasting two distinct
modes of democracy. Here, populism can be conceived
as a political logic specific to late modern party democra-
cies which sees the replacement of party mediation with
more direct forms of political representation (Bickerton
& Invernizzi, in press).
3.1. On ‘Techno-Populism’
Populist parties rarely appear in pure versions and often
combine their claims with different left and right ide-
ologies. Recently, Zulianello (2020) has qualified and
expanded previous typologies of populist parties in con-
temporary Europe (March, 2011; Mudde, 2004). Beyond
the general categories of left- and right-wing populism,
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Zulianello identifies a separate category of ‘valence pop-
ulism.’ This type of populism would define parties that
predominantly compete on non-positional issues such as
competence and performance. Valence populism would
thus be neither right or left, nor exclusionary or inclu-
sionary. In such a categorisation, all other ideological
elements are diluted or non-existent, forming a new
category rather than a subtype of right-wing or left-
wing populism. Unlike this categorisation, however, we
are interested in identifying a populism that is ideo-
logically anchored on the left but also displays techno-
cratic traits, a subtype that does not clearly fit under
Zulianello’s typology.
While technocracy is commonly singled out as the
polar opposite of populism, a closer examination of
both logics reveals some abiding similarities. Both tech-
nocracy and populism share a difficult relationship to
‘indirect’ or ‘mediated’ representation (Caramani, 2017).
In opposing mediation, they also share a conflicting rela-
tionship to intermediary bodies which organise social
life and individuals’ relationships to states, such as par-
ties, unions and traditional media. This compatibility in
part warrants the term ‘techno-populism.’ In this constel-
lation, technocratic and populist themes are unified to
combine a double attack on mediation.
From this perspective, technocratic elitism is not
necessarily inimical to populism (Pappas, 2016). There
are historical instances that bear out this compatibility.
Populist and technocratic forms of politics have been
combined in Latin American politics. Notably, the for-
mer Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa, who won three
presidential elections as a left-of-centre politician with a
populist platform that had a curiously elitist and techno-
cratic bent (de la Torre, 2013, p. 33). In North America,
the Canadian Social Credit movement became one of
the most successful (populist) movements and argued
for a largely technocratic regime (Mudde, 2004, p. 547).
In Europe, several examples of this mixture became vis-
ible throughout the 2000s. Figures such as Pim Fortuyn
hoped to replace the Dutch government with an ‘admin-
istration of experts’ while installing monthly referenda
(Pels, 2005). Thierry Baudet has similarly railed against
the Dutch ‘party cartel,’ seeking to replace the cur-
rent government with a ‘business cabinet.’ Fortuyn and
Baudet were preceded by Belgian politicians such as
Guy Verhofstadt, who proposed the introduction of an
American-style Supreme Court in Belgium in the early
1990s coupled with periodic referenda (Elchardus, 2002).
As mentioned, this mixture is less paradoxical than it
might seem. It is in the void left behind by the decline of
party democracy in which both ‘technocracy’ and ‘pop-
ulism’ thrive (Mair, 2011), occasionally coagulating into
the ‘techno-populist’ hybrid.
Our study focuses on two historically and geo-
graphically specific manifestations of left-wing techno-
populism, emerging in the wake of the 2008 financial
crisis in Spain and the UK. An application of the term
‘techno-populism’ to Podemos and Corbynism might
seem counterintuitive at first. We stress that there is
no need to call these parties ‘techno-populist’ mono-
liths since they display other residual ideological ele-
ments, ranging from socialist to syndicalist traditions.
In the post-cartel era, however, ‘technocratic’ and ‘pop-
ulist’ elements have found their ways into these new
formations—both out of choice and of necessity. Rather
than as a full-blown ‘techno-populist’ party, these vari-
ants are best understood as instantiating subtypes of
their broader left-populist tendency.
The technocratic traits of Corbynism and Podemos
are visible in the adoption of a language of exper-
tise and technical competence and their enthusiasm
for what Paulo Gerbaudo has styled the ‘digital party’
(Gerbaudo, 2018) Furthermore, de la Torre (2013) iden-
tifies a figure that is apt to capture the technocratic
nature of both political projects: the ‘post-neoliberal
expert.’ As their neoliberal counterparts on the right,
post-neoliberal experts see themselves as transcending
particularistic criteria in order to act in society’s best
interest (de la Torre, 2013, p. 39). Both the neoliberal and
post-neoliberal experts respond to a similar ideology of
method (Centeno, 1993; Pastorella, 2016), though they
lean towards different methods (see, e.g., Silva, 1991,
pp. 390–394). Post-neoliberal experts are situatedwithin
think-tanks and academia and they uniformly reject the
neoliberal economic order and its emphasis on unfet-
teredmarkets. To the extent that post-neoliberal experts
claim to possess a specific competence for the conduct
of policy affairs, we can think of the partisan use of this
expertise as technocratic. As we emphasize in our analy-
sis, these experts have played an influential advisory role
in both movements. Finally, the ‘techno-populist’ sub-
type exemplified by Corbynism and Podemos was neces-
sitated by systemic pressures. The need to pose as ‘com-
petent’ competitors of established political forces, which
had advocated for technical competence as an electoral
quality and delegated more policy-making powers to
independent bodies (e.g., central banks, fiscal councils),
compelled the leadership of these parties to compete
according to a technocratic logic.
4. ‘Intra-Party’ and ‘Extra-Party’ Techno-Populism
4.1. Intra-Party: Corbynism
Few movements have enjoyed such unlikely success as
the Corbynite movement of the British Labour Party of
the last five years (Bolton & Pitts, 2018; Seymour, 2016).
Put forward for merely tactical reasons by party lead-
ers in 2015, the democratisation of the leadership con-
test led to an influx of external party members. In 2017,
it vied for power in an election with Theresa May and
achieved 40% of the vote, the largest voting increase
for Labour in the post-war period. Three years later,
Corbyn was out of power and a new group of moder-
ates reclaimed the saddle.What had happened andwhat
drove the Corbynite insurgency? Like its counterpart
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Podemos, the rise of Corbynism requires understand-
ing on a double timeline, the first one long-term—the
increasing intra-party cartelization of the British Labour
Party—and one short-term, relating to the fallout of the
2008 credit crisis.
In answering these questions, the sense in which
Corbynism qualifies as ‘populist’ will also become clearer.
Taken on its basic colloquial level, application of the
term ‘populist’ seems perhaps unwarranted. Applied in
an organisational and ideological sense, however, the
populist character of Corbynism becomes more under-
standable (Bale & Watts, 2018; Mouffe, 2018). Corbyn
invoked the older Blairite slogan ‘the many against the
few’ and saw itself as representing a forgotten ‘peo-
ple’ in British politics distinct from the Tory coalition.
The institutional legacy of a British form of carteliza-
tion played a paramount role here. Blair steadily cut
ties with the remaining union influence and his com-
mitment to scrapping Clause IV exemplified a broader
ideological shift, centralising power around him inside
the party while decreasing parliamentary supremacy in
Britain as a whole. As Peter Mair noted, this led to a
peculiar adoption of consociational ideas for a country
whose political culture hardly had such precedents (Mair,
2000). Blair introduced regional assemblies for Wales
and granted Scottish autonomy. Furthermore, although
never a supporter of the euro, Blair remained a partici-
pant in European unification efforts through the Lisbon
and Nice treaties. Central bank independence was one
of Blairism’s most hallowed goals. Driven by Ed Balls,
New Labour looked at the Bank of England as a pow-
erful counterforce to inflation thanks to its status as
an unelected power (Keegan, 2004). Together with the
increasing influx of non-party members into its adminis-
tration, fromexperts in ‘quangos’ to spin-doctors, Labour
engaged in a specifically British cartelization within a
bipartisan, parliamentary system with a strongly techno-
cratic basis in the civil service (Mair, 2000, 2005).
At the same time, populist elements ran through
the New Labour project from the beginning. Rather
than going through classical party channels, Blair sought
direct connection with electorates outside of the party
and relied on Public Relations means. He also switched
an older language of ‘class’ to that of the ‘people,’ exem-
plified by his Diana elegy. By 2008, Blair had completed
the techno-populist hybrid. Worried by Labour’s lack of
support in middle-class sectors, Blair promised decreas-
ing union militancy and expanded homeownership, con-
solidating the financialisation of the economy ushered
in by the Thatcher era. Since working class voters had
‘nowhere else to go,’ Labour retained a broader coalition
between propertied middle classes and post-industrial
working classes.
The 2008 crisis ripped apart the fractious social
contract which had tied this Labour coalition together.
Austerity shrunk public sectors across the country, push-
ing a large part of the domestic working class into destitu-
tion. Its impact was also generationally skewed. Younger
citizens now faced an economywith declining investment
in long-term jobs and increasing precarity. While fighting
the central banking crisis saved a financial sector, it also
resulted in ushering further rentiership through the back-
door. As investments were drawn out of the real econ-
omy, capital increasingly flowed into asset-holding. This
drove up rent prices in many central cities, where many
young Britons ended up after their university studies. The
confluence of these factors proved incendiary, driving
younger voters into a Labour Party still dedicated to aus-
terity but unable to cater for a new urban electorate.
Three main factors explain the internal nature of
Corbyn’s populist revolt. As discussed above, unlike the
Spanish case, the majoritarian aspect of the British elec-
toral system made external party success more difficult.
The case of UKIP winning 12.6% of the vote in 2015
but only securing one MP exemplifies the limits of con-
structing a viable left-wing alternative to Labour in the
Commons. In 2013, filmmaker Ken Loach and a group
of Socialist Workers Party-affiliated activists tried to field
candidates for exactly such an alternative. These options
quickly faced a stark electoral ceiling, however, and
found it difficult to make inroads in established Labour
constituencies. When Corbyn ascended to the position
of leader in 2015, the group duly supported Labour
again. Here, internal radicalism had solved the problem
of an alternative; there were no competing arguments
on the left.
Although a powerful driver, the first-past-the-post
system is not sufficient to fully explain Corbynism’s intra-
party nature. As Corbyn himself acknowledged in 2015, a
strong second factor was the ideological presence of an
Old Labour traditionwithin Labour itself (Seymour, 2016).
In the 1970s, Corbyn already allied himself with Bennite
currents in Labour and continued to oppose EU mem-
bership for the party (Medhurst, 2014; Rentoul, 2013).
Throughout the Blair years from 1998 to 2010, Corbyn
remained a recalcitrant backbencher and defied party
whips several times. His commitment to anti-imperialist
positions and vocal opposition to the Iraq War distin-
guished him frommainstreamparty opinion in the 2000s.
Added to the restrictions of first-past-the-post, this main-
tenance of an alternative tradition within the Labour
party alsomade intra-party populism amore viable alter-
native than extra-party intervention.
A final driving factor was a consequence of ‘latent
popularisation’—Ed Milliband’s opening of the party list
to external voters (Atkins & Gaffney, 2017). Milliband
introduced American-style primaries to Labour and
made it possible for non-members to vote on partymem-
bers on the condition that they would pay a small fee.
This reform radically lowered the threshold for a pop-
ulist overhaul.
One way of gauging the co-existence of techno-
cratic and populist registers in Corbynism is purely ide-
ological. In its emphasis on technological innovation
and automation, Corbyn enjoyed a momentum centred
around technical expertise. Yet there also was a strongly
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organisational legacy on this techno-populist front. The
Labour-supporting grassroots organisation Momentum,
for instance, combined focused electoral campaigning
with digital outreach, in which members could consult
online and vote on policy platforms. Such emphases
on digital democracy were coupled with discourses
celebrating full automation and a new jobless econ-
omy. Continuities with Blair’s techno-populism went
beyond the merely rhetorical, however. Sociologically,
Corbynismalso seemed to drawon the samebases as the
Blairite coalition—an urban precariat and middle class—
and lived by a ‘hyper-urbanism.’ By bringing in think-
tanks and side-lining unions, Corbynism combined an
appeal to a popular subject with emphases on techni-
cal expertise and digital democracy. Except for its per-
sonalism (‘no Corbynism without Corbyn’), Corbynism
thus saw itself as the representative of a non-class-based
majority which could rely on technocratic assistance to
achieve social justice.
One sign of this technocratic bent was an increas-
ing reliance on think-tanks and economic experts within
the Corbynite party administration. Exemplified by fig-
ures such as James Meadway, Ann Pettifor, Joe Guinan,
Mariana Mazzucato, Anastasia Nesvetailova or David
Blanchflower, Corbyn’s Labour Party saw its own propos-
als to end austerity as part of ‘economic commonsense’
and politically rational. Together with Momentum’s
reliance on online outreach and the construction of
a ‘digital party,’ the specifically technocratic nature of
Corbyn’s left-populism came to the fore (Gerbaudo,
2018). As with Podemos, however, the origin of these
technocratic elements was more external than internal.
Previous Labour cabinets (both shadow and in office)
had been suspicious that their party would not enjoy
trust as a deliverer of policy; consequently, Corbynites
sought to counter these suspicions by presenting their
own programmes as “sound policy” and “sensible poli-
tics” (Bolton & Pitts, 2018). Both on the level of policy
and politics, Corbyn combined these ‘technocratic’ and
‘populist’ elements while also remaining rooted in an
older left-wing tradition.
4.2. Extra-Party: Podemos
4.2.1. The Long Cartelization
From 1982 to 2015, the centre-left Socialist Party
(PSOE) and the centre-right Popular Party (PP) domi-
nated Spanish politics. Over time, this dominance cre-
ated the equivalent of a party cartel. The carteliza-
tion of the Spanish party system started in the late-
1980s and peaked in the mid-2000s. This process was
characterised by the growing dependence of the domi-
nant parties on the state, a pattern of inter-party collu-
sion and ‘constrained policy competition.’ Over the long
run, this cartelization set the conditions for the rise of
techno-populism as an ‘extra-party’ intervention after
the Great Recession.
Between 1989 and 2008, the PSOE and PP moved
decisively towards the state. As these parties alter-
nated in power, they both recognised a ‘shared’ inter-
est in minimizing the costs of electoral defeats. One ‘risk
minimization’ strategy was political patronage: appoint-
ments of party officials to high-level public positions,
access to well-paid destinations in EU institutions for
former politicians and privileged employment in priva-
tised companies. Internally, this patronage also served
as a leadership tool to defuse intra-party pressures, turn-
ing party activism into an attractive vehicle for individ-
ual careerism. In the mid-1980s, for example, the PSOE
had offered activists the possibility of holding no fewer
than 25,000 political positions in the public administra-
tion (Gillespie, 1989, pp. 131–132). By 1988, 70% of
PSOE’s congress delegates were already on government
payroll (Ban, 2016, p. 51). As the privilege of appoint-
ing party representatives to public institutions at all
levels of government was enshrined in law, catch-all
party politics was gradually replaced by the politics of
a cartel (cf. Katz & Mair, 2009, p. 757). The two par-
ties increasingly tied themselves to the state apparatus,
while moving away from their bases and society at large
(cf. Mair, 2011).
However, the excessively close relationship of the
parties with the state bordered on the corrupt in
the semi-public banking sector. Here, cartelization was
equated more clearly with ‘rent-seeking,’ i.e., the extrac-
tion of revenues higher than those thatwould be allowed
by competition between non-cartel parties (cf. Katz &
Mair, 2018, pp. 138–139). Prior to the crisis of 2008, the
involvement of themain parties in the (mis)management
of the regional savings banks (Cajas de ahorros) reveals a
crucial instance of inter-party collusion. Formally, the 45
savings banks were private deposit institutions, but local
governments could regulate and control them; over time,
many Cajas ended up being run by politicians with no
previous banking experience (Cuñat & Garicano, 2010).
These institutions ended up in the financial epicentre
of the brick-and-mortar bubble of the 2000s. When the
housing bubble burst in 2008, the symbiosis between
the political parties and the Cajas had slipped into nepo-
tism. In 2012, the nationalisation of Bankia triggered
Spain’s request of an EU-backed financial bailout. Amidst
ruinous investments and corruption scandals, public cyn-
icism towards the main parties increased.
4.2.2. The Great Recession and the Cartel Breakdown
The fallout of the 2008 crash set the conditions for the
breakdown of a hyper-cartelized party system. Between
2008 and 2014, Spain experienced a financial crisis while
going through two consecutive recessions. The financial
crisis turned into a sovereign debt crisis in 2012 that
worsened in the wake of the balance-of-payment crisis.
By early 2014, when the first signs of economic recovery
arose, the Spanish economy had been in recession since
the second half of 2008, one-quarter of the Spanishwork-
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force had been out of work and youth unemployment
had surpassed 50%.
The party cartel did not break up overnight though.
The PSOE, in government during the first stage of the
crisis, was punished in the 2011 general election, when
it lost about 20% of the vote share. It was replaced by
the PP, which obtained the second largest majority in
the democratic era. In the first year of government, how-
ever, the PP had already lost half of its electorate (Orriols
& Cordero, 2016, p. 475). From May 2010 onwards, the
programmatic differences between the Socialists and the
Conservatives faded away. At the height of the euro cri-
sis, Spain almost lost access to international bond mar-
kets. To regain market credibility, the two governments
implemented drastic fiscal adjustments. In 2011, pres-
sured by the European Central Bank and Northern euro-
zone governments, the main parties rushed to constitu-
tionalise the prevailing fiscal orthodoxy in the eurozone:
Budgetary balance and the absolute priority for debt
repayment. This constitutional reform did not prevent
the government from having to rescue the financial sec-
tor in 2012 with EU support; a financial rescue that was
followed by further cuts in public expenditure and tax
increases. Thus, the central question of whether itmakes
a difference who wins the election, as Katz and Mair
would put it (2009, p. 757), was unequivocally answered
in the Spanish case. Despite the alternation in power, it
hardly made a difference in terms of policies.
Over the past two decades, the narrowest gap in the
economic left/right axis between the PP and the PSOE,
as perceived by country experts (Bakker et al., 2020), has
been observed in 1999 and 2014—the two periods coin-
ciding with Spain’s accession to the euro and the euro
crisis. At critical junctures, therefore, party competition
became less about offering meaningful economic alter-
natives than about ‘constraining’ the policy space. In the
wake of the 2008 crisis, both parties accepted that fiscal
austerity has turned into a macroeconomic imperative
for a debtor country. The cartel’s firm commitment to
euro membership foreclosed the possibility of an intra-
party challenge to this consensus. In 2015, this sense of
‘choiceless’ competition will be exploited by Podemos
(cf. Errejón & Mouffe, 2016, p. 65).
4.2.3. The Rise of ‘Extra-Party’ Techno-Populism
While the economic crisis was a sufficient condition to
destabilise the two-party cartel, actors’ agency is a neces-
sary condition for party system change. If a fewuniversity
lecturers had not decided to create Podemos in 2014, the
two-party system might have been weakened but still
survive the crisis. In the 2015 general election, the car-
tel model of ‘constrained competition’ reached its lim-
its. Support for the two main parties collapsed. For the
past two decades, the two parties have obtained more
than 80% of the seats; in 2015 they only managed 61%
(Orriols & Cordero, 2016, p. 470). The Parliament frag-
mented: The effective number of electoral parties (ENEP)
rose from 3.3 in 2011 to 5.0 in 2015 (Orriols & Cordero,
2016, p. 479). Podemos became the third largest parlia-
mentary force with 20.7% of the vote. Podemos concen-
trated a large part of the protest vote against the car-
tel parties, but its parliamentary rise was also facilitated
by institutional electoral factors. Spain’s proportional sys-
tem is less punitive with third parties than the British
majoritarian system. And so, despite having lost votes
and seats since 2016, Podemoshas stillmanaged tomain-
tain its relevance in Spanish politics.
Podemos is an ideological hybrid, blending populist
and technocratic traits while remaining firmly rooted on
the left (Bickerton & Invernizzi, in press). As a political
project, it displayed an unusual combination of deep the-
oretical reflection on Laclau’s populism (Laclau, 2005)
and direct involvement with left-wing populism in Latin
America (Kioupkiolis, 2016). In the Spanish context, this
‘reflexive praxis’ was translated on a ‘populist hypothe-
sis:’ “the traditional ideological categories of ‘left’ and
‘right’ have become historically exhausted” and a new
dimension of political confrontation ought to be cre-
ated between ‘the people’ or ‘democracy,’ and ‘elites’ or
‘la casta’ (Bickerton & Invernizzi, in press).
Such populist hypothesis interpreted political strug-
gles almost exclusively in discursive terms, accepting
that political preferences are not predetermined by posi-
tions in the social structure (contra Lipset & Rokkan,
1967): “[The thesis] was that politics is construction of
meaning and that therefore discourse is not a ‘garment’
of political positions pre-determined elsewhere (econ-
omy, geography, history) but the fundamental battle-
ground for…changing the balances of forces in a society”
(Errejón, 2016). Central to the party’s populist discourse
was the notion of ‘la casta’ (Kioupkiolis, 2016, p. 5), which
captures a recognisable aspect of the old party cartel.
La casta refers to a distant and corrupt elite operating in
a (cartelized) system where parties collude for their own
gain at the expense of ‘ordinary people.’ “The old polit-
ical parties,” the leading founder of Podemos observed,
“appear to the citizens as little more than machines for
getting access to the state administration by electoral
means” (Iglesias, 2015, p. 20). The newparty constructed
a frontier between the ‘people’ and the ‘oligarchy’ by
proclaiming a ‘regime crisis’: the “exhaustion of the polit-
ical and social system that emerged from the post-Franco
transition” (Iglesias, 2015, p. 10).
In comparison to its populism, Podemos’ technocratic
features are less obvious. Podemos was created almost
exclusively by a few university lecturers, most of whom
were political scientists. All the founding members—
Pablo Iglesias, Juan Carlos Monedero, Carolina Bescansa,
Luis Alegre and Íñigo Errejón—shared a similar academic
background, the same judgement of the ‘Bolivarian’
experiences in Latin America and, in several cases, the
common experience of working as advisors for vari-
ous Latin American governments through the think-tank
Fundación Centro de Estudios Políticos y Sociales (CEPS).
Podemos does not fit the model of a porous organiza-
Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 4, Pages 533–544 540
tion, nor one created by plural and diverse personali-
ties, but one led by a small group of experts with almost
identical backgrounds who claim to have a special knowl-
edge of politics and whose offering is predicated on a
binary, absolute and moralistic understanding of politics:
the many and the few, the decent and the corrupt, right
and wrong policies. This sociology of the party’s leader-
ship gave rise to a particular form of left-wing elitism,
which fits with the kind of post-neoliberal expertise that
Carlos de la Torre associated with Rafael Correa’s techno-
populism in Ecuador (cf. de la Torre, 2013).
Other observers have highlighted a different techno-
political aspect of Podemos; namely, its adoption of
digital media in a hybrid party structure that shows
characteristics of digital networks and social move-
ments (Kioupkiolis & Perez, 2019, p. 28; cf. della Porta,
Fernández, Kouki, & Mosca, 2017). Like Corbynism,
Podemos’ use of social media and new digital technolo-
gies has challenged the traditional role of media in the
construction of political discourse. While this interpreta-
tion of tecno-politics equates the ‘techno-’ with the use
of new technologies in political communication, it relates
to our broader understanding of techno-populism in one
crucial respect. The preference for digital technologies
to communicate directly with the people, while bypass-
ing and criticising the intermediary role of the media,
dispense with the functions of political mediation in a
democracy, advocating instead for more direct and less
pluralistic practices of political representation.
Podemos’ technocratic traits arose also from exter-
nal or systemic pressure. Against the backdrop of col-
lusion and institutional capture by the two major par-
ties, Podemos accepted the need to appeal to exper-
tise as a precondition for governing in post-crisis Spain.
By 2014, the idea that experts should take more deci-
sions in public office had become a popular proposition
among Spaniards, as consistently shown by public opin-
ion surveys (cf. Fernández-Albertos, 2018, pp. 91–93).
In government, Podemos has insisted on this idea to jus-
tify, for example, the appointment of the renowned soci-
ologist Manuel Castells as the Minister of Universities.
Furthermore, the party has accepted to govern under
the supervision of all independent and specialist bod-
ies created after the 2008 financial crisis. Not because
Podemos has turned sympathetic towards unelected
power, but because the party has accommodated its
political offer to the prevailing technocratic logic; a logic
that increasingly forces political parties to appeal to
expertise and to govern alongwith the actorswho report-
edly possess it. It is in this precise sense that we claim
that the transition from cartel to techno-populist parties
is taking place both out of choice and of necessity.
4.2.4. The Aftermath: Adaptation, Crisis and
Government
New parties cannot define all the relevant dimensions
of political competition by themselves, even when they
claim otherwise. In post-crisis Spain, the left/right divide
has proven very resilient (Vidal, 2018). As voters, the
media and other parties consistently placed Podemos on
the far left, the party ended up competingmore explicitly
from the left. In theMay 2016 general election, Podemos
ran in coalition with IU and other left-wing forces. This
coalition became the third largest force in the Parliament,
only 14 seats behind the PSOE. At that time, the lead-
ers of Podemoswere still waiting for the ‘Pasokization’ of
the PSOE in the hope of overtaking it as the main oppo-
sition party.
However, this strategy was not fully endorsed inside
the party. The internal division in Podemos was most
bitterly expressed in the disagreement between two of
the leading founders, Pablo Iglesias and Íñigo Errejón.
According to Errejón (2020), “it was clear that there
are not five million communists in Spain.” The party
should aim to consolidate a more ideologically diverse
coalition. To this end, the populist strategy seemed
more effective. But at the second Party Congress in
February 2017 (Vistalegre II), the more leftist the-
ses defended by Iglesias prevailed over the ‘populist-
transversal’ vision championed by Errejón. In 2019,
Errejón abandoned Podemos to create a new political
platform (Mas Madrid/Mas País).
After the fourth general election in as many years,
Podemos entered a coalition government with the PSOE
in December 2019. Only two months later, the Covid-19
crisis hit the world. In 2015, Podemos had entered the
Spanish parliament reclaiming the power of the people,
for the people and against ‘la casta.’ It has ended up co-
managing a global pandemic at the behest of experts
and, reportedly, on the basis of scientific knowledge.
Thus, if there is one recent European experience where
extra-party techno-populism is being put to the test, it
is undoubtedly the Spanish one. While it is too early to
assess the political legacy of the Covid-19 crisis, there is
now less doubt about the analytical utility of understand-
ing Podemos from the perspective of techno-populism.
5. Conclusion
This article has emphasized the complementarity of pop-
ulism and technocracy through a comparative study of
two recent techno-populist experiences: Podemos and
Corbynism. Firmly anchored on a left populist platform,
neither Podemos nor Corbynism moved into the openly
‘techno-populist’ territory of parties such as the Five
Star Movement. But the integration of distinctly tech-
nocratic elements is evidenced by their reliance on
‘post-neoliberal experts’ and the preference for unmedi-
ated forms of communication through the use of digi-
tal technologies. Their technocratic traits are also the
result of systemic pressures, arising from electoral con-
texts shaped by claims to competence and policy envi-
ronments dominated by the influence of independent,
non-partisan and expert institutions. These factors are
not exclusive to Podemos and Corbynism but com-
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mon to most political parties in the post-2008 era. The
Covid-19 crisis only seems to have exacerbated the per-
vasiveness of this technocratic logic in contemporary
European politics.
In our two cases, the long-term party cartelization
and the fiscal response to the global financial crisis cut
across other institutional differences in Spain and the
UK. But these institutional differences set the conditions
for the distinct ‘intra-’ and ‘extra-party’manifestations of
techno-populism. Three factors need highlighting in our
comparison. The first is the persistent creativity of pop-
ulist logics across party and electoral systems; whether
in two-party or multi-party systems, majoritarian or pro-
portional representation systems, populism will adapt
to given ecosystems by opting for intra-party or extra-
party strategies. What might drive the occurrence of
such intra- or extra-party manifestation has been the
main question driving this paper. The second factor, how-
ever, is the sheer contingency of the populist success
story. For instance, if in the 2017 general election Corbyn
had won the same votes under a Spanish-like electoral
system, the balance sheet on left-populist success would
have looked different. Therefore, the main conclusion
pertains to the institutional contingency of populism’s
success, which often relies on a slim set of institutional
factors. Finally, there is no need to homogenise different
populist experiences. Cartelization did express itself as
a cross-national phenomenon but never took on a per-
fectly homogeneous form. Researchers will have to insist
on national and historical particularities in each case.
The same holds for its ongoing techno-populist reaction,
which is adapting itself to different party landscapes and
institutional parameters.
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